The Skeptic's Corner
By Duke Heath
In the early eighties, I devoured every book by Stephen King I could
find. When King alone could not satisfy my appetite for horror,
I began reading Dean Koontz and other authors in the genre. Though
my tastes have changed over the past ten years, I recently finished
what is, by far, the most horrifying book I have ever read. The
most frightening aspect of this book, BIOHAZARD, by Ken Alibek,
is that the genre is not horror or fiction, but non-fiction.
Ken Alibek is the former head of the Soviet Union's bio-weapons
program. BIOHAZARD is the true story of the largest covert biological
weapons program in the world, written by the man who ran it after
he defected to the U.S. in 1992. Under Alibek, the Soviet Union
developed several highly efficient biological weapons, including
tularaemia, plague, ebola, and anthrax.
The anthrax the Soviets developed is the most drug resistant, highly
weaponized form of the disease found on earth. This highly deadly
and potent strain of the bacteria was discovered after an accident
at a bio weapons lab leaked liquid anthrax into the sewers. Soon
rodents became infected with anthrax. Though the sewers were regularly
disinfected after the accident, the disease lurked underground for
years.
Three years after the accident, a rodent was discovered with an
extremely virulent and resistant new strain. It was from this rodent
that the foundation of the Soviet anthrax program was built. The
Soviet anthrax program manufactured and stored twenty tons of anthrax
each year. This "Anthrax 836," as it is called, is so highly weaponized
that under ideal conditions 100 kgs. could kill more than three
million people in a large city.
When Ebola suddenly appeared in Marburg Germany, the KGB brought
the virus back to the Soviet Union. The virus became the most lethal
weapon in the program. Though plans were in place to attack western
cities with aerosols of these weapons should war break out, they
were not the main weapons to be used against the U.S. That weapon?
Smallpox!
In 1959, a traveler from India infected 46 Muscovites with smallpox.
Though the traveler had been vaccinated several years earlier, he
had become a carrier for an unusually virulent form of the disease.
The Soviet Union sent a team to purge India of this highly infective
form of smallpox. The KGB went with them and brought back a strain
of Indian smallpox excellently suited for weaponization. The Soviets
stockpiled twenty tons of this virus per year as far back as the
seventies.
It takes ten to twenty thousand spores of anthrax to infect someone.
Fewer than five particles of the India smallpox strain will infect
an individual. That individual will then become infectious, with
the ability to infect others with just a cough. Smallpox usually
takes seven to ten days to incubate. The India strain takes only
one to four days to incubate. This short incubation severely limits
the role of vaccinations after an attack.
The single scariest fact in the book was the salary the Soviets
paid their top people in the bio-weapons program. When Ken Alibek
was inspecting the Pine Bluff Asenal, he inquired about how much
someone with his knowledge could make in this country. He was told
it would easily be in the six figure range. The head of the Soviet
Union Bio-Weapons program was making about one hundred dollars a
month at that time. So now he is on our side. But what of his hundreds
of colleagues with the same knowledge? What of the hundreds of tons
of bio-weapons manufactured in the Soviet Union during his leadership?
Hundreds of KGB agents were instructed in how to transport bio-weapon
strains in small vials across borders. These instructions were designed
to get exotic viruses into the weapons program from all parts of
the world. The same instructions could easily allow for transport
of highly evolved bio-weapon strains to any government or terrorist
group in the world for the right price. The money is obviously out
there, as are the India smallpox and Anthrax 836 strains.
Ironically, the dramatic fall of the Soviet Union and resultant
lack of rigid controls over their bio-weapons programs probably
placed us in more danger from biological warfare than we had been
in before the collapse.
